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ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY PITFALLS FOR
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS
TIMOTHY G. ROGERS
LA URENCE S. KIRSCH
PAUL D. STEVELMAN *
On February 2, 1990, the Operating Engineers Local 37 Pension Fund
filed suit against several former owners of a 64-acre site in Reistertown,
Maryland, that the fund had purchased several years earlier. The law-
suit was filed after pension fund officials discovered that the land, on
which the fund had intended to develop a shopping center and 426 resi-
dential units, was contaminated with high concentrations of allegedly
carcinogenic heavy metals and volatile organic compounds. The suit al-
leged negligence, fraud and nuisance, among other counts, and sought
$5 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive dam-
ages from each defendant on each count. In its current state, the land
is, at best, worthless; at worst, the hazardous waste contamination could
turn the pension fund's asset into a multi-million dollar liability for haz-
ardous waste clean-up costs.
INTRODUCTION
DENSION plan fiduciaries and their counsel are becoming increas-
ingly concerned by a statute that intuitively may seem unrelated to
pension plans, but, in actuality, could have profound significance for
them. That statute is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund).'
Pension plans are not in the business of manufacturing, handling, using
or disposing of hazardous chemicals. Nonetheless, pension plan adminis-
trators must be wary of and take precautions against CERCLA liability,
else risk potential losses unparalleled in their routine operations.
Pension plans may be subject to CERCLA liability through two of
their activities: (1) direct investment in real estate2 or (2) loans secured
* Mr. Rogers is a member of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, resident in its New
York office. Messrs. Kirsch and Stevelman are associates at the firm, resident in its
Washington, D.C. and New York offices, respectively.
1. CERCLA §§ 101-308 (1980), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. 1988). Pub-
lic employee retirement systems investing in, or making loans secured by, real property
also face other environmental risks, including, among others, liability under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, 6981 (1976) (the hazardous
waste regulatory law), or liability for indoor air pollution.. See Kirsch, Legal Develop-
ments in Indoor Air Pollution, Indoor Air Pollution: A Complete Resource Guide (BNA
1988); Kirsch, Behind Closed Doors. Indoor Air Pollution and Government Policy, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (1982). This article, however, will focus on liability under
CERCLA.
2. Plans may invest directly in real estate by buying it or entering into sale and lease-
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by real property or manufacturing operations.' Moreover, plans may
find their once-valuable investments and their collateral for loans to be
worthless when CERCLA liabilities arise. Therefore, plan administra-
tors are well advised to educate themselves about CERCLA and the
means of protecting their plans against the statute's broad reach.
Given the magnitude of CERCLA liability, any prudent business per-
son investing in or making loans secured by real estate has reason for
concern. Plan fiduciaries, however, must be especially wary. They are
charged with duties of loyalty, prudence, portfolio diversity, and compli-
ance with the plan's instruments. While the possibility of high returns on
investments led plans away from traditional portfolios of United States
government securities, highly-rated debt instruments, and common stock
of blue chip companies and into more lucrative investments in real estate,
the duty of prudence to protect fund assets obligates administrators to
exercise particular caution in certain real estate investments.
This article will discuss the susceptibility of public employee pension
funds to liability under CERCLA. First, the article will present an over-
view of CERCLA. This overview includes a discussion of CERCLA's
enactment and amendment, an analysis of its statutory structure, parties
held liable under CERCLA, substances considered hazardous under
CERCLA, the Superfund clean-up process, and the statutory standard of
liability. Second, the article will review the effect of CERCLA liability
upon pension funds. Finally, the article will present certain suggestions
that pension plan fiduciaries and lawyers may wish to consider in mini-
mizing the risks of incurring environmental liability under CERCLA
without foregoing the benefits of investing in real estate.
I. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
A. CERCLA's Enactment and Amendment
Spurred by the public outcry and alarm generated by the discovery of
such troubled sites as Love Canal and Times Beach, Congress enacted
CERCLA in 1980 to address the problem of inactive and abandoned haz-
ardous waste sites throughout the country. In Congress' haste to re-
spond to this growing problem, staffers hurriedly pieced together largely
inconsistent Senate and House bills,4 and in just two days drafted the bill
back arrangements. In addition, plans may invest in real estate through pooled arrange-
ments such as partnerships, joint ventures, real estate investment trusts, or bank-spon-
sored common trust funds. Moreover, a plan may invest passively in real estate by
acquiring mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation or the Government National Mortgage Association. See generally Kanner,
Pension Fund Investment in Real Estate, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 343 (1980); [1982] Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 376, at 74 (1982).
3. Plans may finance real estate investments by providing construction financing for
a project or by providing mortgage financing for acquisition of the property.
4. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 30,898 (1980); H.R. 7020, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 26,689 (1980); H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. 26,334 (1980).
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that became CERCLA.5 Too often, Congress resolved disagreements in
approach or philosophy by omitting disputed provisions from the legisla-
tion. For example, as enacted in 1980, CERCLA held certain enumer-
ated classes of parties liable for the cost of remedying sites at which
hazardous substances had been disposed,6 but the statute did not specify
whether the liability it created was strict, joint or several. CERCLA also
failed to clarify the role of causation in determining the scope of a party's
liability. The burden of bringing order from the chaos fell to the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency charged
with administering CERCLA, and the courts.
Congress amended CERCLA by passing the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).7 SARA was hailed as a re-
form statute, designed to bridge the gaps created by CERCLA. Any
cures which SARA may have provided, however, are difficult to ascer-
tain. For example, although SARA purported to resolve several of the
disputed issues of interpretation that had arisen since CERCLA's enact-
ment, the courts, in fact, had already resolved many of those issues
before SARA was passed.8 What SARA did achieve, however, was the
creation of a series of elaborate, burdensome, and costly standards and
procedures that must be followed in all Superfund clean-up actions. Un-
fortunately, the implementation of those standards and procedures has
served to increase the already prohibitive cost of Superfund remedial ac-
tions, 9 and to delay further the snail's pace at which those actions have
been conducted."0
B. Statutory Structure
CERCLA authorizes EPA to respond to releases or threats of releases
of hazardous substances. This response may take two forms. EPA may
conduct short-term "removal actions," involving, for example, the re-
moval of drums or soil, securing of the site, or building dikes to prevent
contaminants from escaping from the site." In addition, EPA may per-
5. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md.
1986) ("The structure of section 107(a) [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)], like so much of this hastily
patched together Compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity.").
6. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
7. Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 1-405, 100 Stat. 1613-1781 (1986).
8. For example, before SARA was enacted, several courts had decided that liability
under CERCLA must be joint and several. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm.
and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
9. According to EPA, the average cost of remedying a Superfund site is $32 million.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 6153, 6163 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300).
10. As of February 28, 1990, only 46 of the approximately 1,000 sites placed on
EPA's National Priorities List (a prioritized list of hazardous waste sites qualifying for
federal Superfund attention) have been remediated. See Superfund Progress Report, Of-
fice of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, United States Environmental Protection
Agency (April 6, 1990). See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
11. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988).
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form longer-term and more expensive types of clean-up actions known as
"remedial actions."12 Remedial actions might entail, for example, the
installation of an underground slurry wall to cut off groundwater flow to
or from the contaminated area, the pumping and treatment of ground-
water, and the placement of a clay cap over a site both to eliminate con-
tact with the contaminated surface and to prevent rainwater from
washing contaminants into the groundwater.
CERCLA created an $8.5-billion fund that the government may use to
finance clean-up activities. 3 Congress, however, did not intend for
CERCLA to become a public-works bill under which the federal or state
governments would shoulder the cost for most hazardous waste clean-
ups.14 To avoid that result, CERCLA enumerates classes of individuals
who are liable for such cost. 5 Such persons are commonly known as
"potentially responsible parties" or "PRPs." Under CERCLA, EPA
either may issue administrative orders directing PRPs to clean up sites
(under section 106) or may perform the response actions itself and re-
cover its costs of clean-up from the PRPs (under section 107). Much of
the authority afforded to EPA has been delegated to state governments. 16
CERCLA further authorizes private parties (whether or not they are
PRPs) to recover remedial costs from PRPs.
C. Parties Held Liable Under CERCLA
CERCLA imposes liability on four categories of persons 7 for costs
connected with the clean-up of hazardous substances. Included in those
categories is any person who:
(1) currently owns or operates a facility at which hazardous sub-
stances have been disposed (even if such person did not dispose of the
hazardous substances, was not aware of past disposal, and did not own
the property at the time of disposal"S);
(2) formerly owned or operated a facility at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance;
12. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
13. CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(a) (1988).
14. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119.
15. In addition to the potential for liability, CERCLA also authorizes the imposition
of a lien on real property for the recovery of fund-financed costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)
(1988). The lien created by CERCLA is not a "superlien," i.e., it does not have priority
over the security interests of other creditors who have perfected their interests prior in
time. Moreover, the federal lien is available only to EPA.
16. CERCLA §§ 104-106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9606 (1988).
17. As a result of recent amendments to SARA, there is some question as to whether
there is also a fifth category of liable persons: an intervening landowner who sells his
land without disclosing knowledge he has about contamination at the site. This possible
fifth category, which could have a profound impact on pension fund liability, is discussed
infra note 55 and accompanying text.
18. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985)
(current property owner liable regardless of blamelessness).
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(3) arranged for disposal or treatment (or for transportation for dis-
posal or treatment) of any hazardous substance at a facility; or
(4) transported a hazardous substance to a facility selected by such
person. 19
The third entity described above, which has come to be known as a
"generator" of hazardous substances, has dominated CERCLA litiga-
tion. The courts have found a surprising array of parties liable as "gener-
ators," including companies that sold hazardous material for profit,20
entities that brokered waste deliveries, 21 organizations that had their pes-
ticides processed by a third party,2 2 and companies that arranged for ma-'
terial to be disposed of at a site different from the one at which the
material actually was disposed.2"
Recently, however, increased attention has focused upon the liability
of owners or operators. The statute defines "owner or operator" simply
as either a person owning or operating a facility, or, if the facility has
been abandoned, a "person who owned, operated, or otherwise con-
19. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The actual language of section
107(a) is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a ... facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility ... owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities ... or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th
Cir. 1989).
21. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Piccillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d
176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., 110 S. Ct. 1115 (1990); United States v. Con-
servation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 176, 240-41 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Missouri v. In-
dependent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
22. See, e.g., Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 176, 234; New York v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials
Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1310 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United
States v. Bliss, 16 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
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trolled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandon-
ment."24 This statutory definition of "owner or operator," however, has
been broadly interpreted by EPA and the courts. For example, a person
may be liable as an "owner" even if he held title for only one hour.25
Moreover, the courts have ruled that lessees of property fall within the
statutory definition of "owner."' 26 Additionally, officers and employees
of companies operating a facility may be treated as owners or operators
and, in some cases, may be held personally liable when they were per-
forming the work of their employer."
The definition of "facility" also is very broad, covering any location
"where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located."12 Clearly, the term is not lim-
ited to "dump sites." Indeed, CERCLA liability has been extended to
such "facilities" as roads or dragstrips on which hazardous substances
were spread, 29 residential developments,3" and even individual homes to
which hazardous substances had been transported on the clothing of fac-
tory workers.31
D. Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA
The broad liability provisions of CERCLA are exacerbated by the cor-
respondingly broad definition of the statutory term "hazardous sub-
stance." When Congress drafted CERCLA in 1980, it took a shortcut in
determining what substances should be considered hazardous. Rather
than redefining those substances that warranted concern, Congress sim-
ply mandated that substances considered hazardous or toxic under a
group of other environmental statutes32 would comprise the universe of
24. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
25. United States v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C.
1984).
26. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984).
27. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1985);
Kelly v. Arco Indus., Inc., 17 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 1114, 1117-18 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32 (D. Vt. 1988); Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at
1306; United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v.
Medley, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1314, 1317-18 (D.S.C. 1986); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
28. CERCLA § 101(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1988); see United States v. Con-
servation Chem Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 185 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see also United States v.
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (horse stables and road where contami-
nated oil was sprayed).
29. See, e.g., Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1303, 1305; United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp.
884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (dragstrip on which PCB-laden oil was placed).
30. See Tanglewood East Homeowners, Inc. v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1572-73 (5th Cir. 1988).
31. See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D. Vt. 1988).
32. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1986).
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"hazardous substances" for purposes of CERCLA.33 This universe is
expansive indeed, and includes thousands of substances, many of which
are quite common. For example, household cleaning solvents, acetic acid
(vinegar), lead (a common pigment in ink), and saccharin are all "haz-
ardous substances" under CERCLA.34
As a consequence, many industrial facilities, as well as residences and
offices, may be locations at which some hazardous substances have come
to be located, and, thus, may be considered hazardous substance "facili-
ties." EPA, state governments, and private parties will not necessarily
take remedial action with regard to all such facilities. The potential for
such action with its attendant liabilities, however, exists for a significant
body of real property. This perspective emphasizes the impact of
CERCLA on real estate transactions.
E. Recoverable Response Costs
CERCLA provides for recovery of "costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion" incurred by the United States or states,35 or "necessary costs of
response" incurred by "any other person."' 36 Various courts have held
that the term "response costs" includes costs of removal, remedial ac-
tion, monitoring, testing, investigating the site, medical evaluations, relo-
cation, provision of alternative water supplies, oversight costs, and
interest.
In addition to response costs, PRPs also are liable for natural resource
damages up to $50 million.37 Under certain circumstances, however, this
monetary cap does not apply,3" and the PRP may be liable for the full
amount of natural resource damages.
F. Standard of Liability Under CERCLA
Even before the enactment of SARA, the courts had concluded that
33. See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
34. Additionally, a material does not have to be a "waste," as it would under RCRA,
to be considered a "hazardous substance" sufficient to trigger liability under CERCLA.
See CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 222 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
35. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
36. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). The statute defines
"respond" or "response" as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such
terms ... include enforcement activities related thereto." CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25) (1988).
37. See CERCLA § 107(c)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (1988); Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 222.
38. The $50-million limitation would not apply where: (1) "the release or threat of
release ... was the result of willful misconduct or willful negligence within the privity or
knowledge of [the] person"; (2) "the primary cause of the release was a violation (within
the privity or knowledge of [the] person) of applicable safety, construction, or operating
standards or regulations"; or (3) the person "fails or refuses to provide all reasonable
cooperation and assistance requested by a responsible public official in connection with
response activities under the national contingency plan with respect to regulated carriers
... or vessels." CERCLA § 107(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (1988).
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Congress intended CERCLA liability to be strict. Lack of negligence or
fault, therefore, has not insulated PRPs from liability. Under applicable
precedent, CERCLA plaintiffs (e.g., EPA and state regulatory agencies)
need not establish that a release of a particular defendant's hazardous
substance caused the incurrence of response costs.3 9 Rather, plaintiffs
need only show that a generator defendant disposed of hazardous sub-
stances of the same kind as those found at the contaminated waste site.
A plaintiff is not further required to prove that a praticular defendant's
waste was present at the site and had been the subject of removal or of
remedial measures, or that the defendant selected the site at which haz-
ardous waste was dumped. The release does not have to be of the same
substance or even the same kind of substance as that which the defendant
disposed.' As a result of this strict liability construction of the statute,
courts have held with some uniformity that CERCLA defendants are
liable when such defendants are within one of the classes of PRPs and
cannot prevail on one of the limited statutory defenses.41
In addition, the courts held that liability under CERCLA is joint and
several where the harm is indivisible.42 Thus, a person contributing any
amount of a hazardous substance could be liable for the total amount of
clean-up costs if it is not possible to apportion accurately the responsibil-
ity for the harm. Apportionment of the harm is often difficult if sub-
stances have been at a site for an extended period of time and because of
the diverse characteristics of hazardous substances. Some courts have
placed upon the defendant the burden of showing that there is a reason-
able basis for apportionment.43
CERCLA liability is also retroactive." Entities that disposed of haz-
ardous substances long before the statute's enactment have been held lia-
ble for remediating disposal sites at which waste was disposed of legally
and in accordance with the best disposal practices at that time.45
Since liability under CERCLA is strict, joint and several, and retroac-
tive, government agencies and private parties suing under CERCLA
have targeted their actions against "deep pocket" defendants. Accord-
ingly, the financial resources of pension plans make them attractive
targets for governmental and private plaintiffs.
39. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
40. See, e.g., Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332-33; United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1309-10 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (traditional tort concepts such as proximate cause do not
apply).
41. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO),
579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 629
(D.N.H. 1988).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1396 (D.N.H.
1985).
44. See, e.g., NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839; Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 621-22.
45. E.g., NEPPACO, 579 F. Supp. 823; Mottolo, 695, F. Supp. 615.
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G. Defenses to CERCLA Liability
Parties to CERCLA lawsuits have employed a variety of defenses. Al-
most invariably, those efforts have failed. For example, although some
courts have allowed equitable defenses to CERCLA actions, such as the
unclean hands defense,46 others have rejected such defenses as contrary
to congressional intent.47
CERCLA explicitly provides for three statutory defenses to liability.
Under section 107(b), there is no liability if:
[the defendant] can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the dam-
ages resulting therefrom were caused solely by -
(a) an act of God;
(b) an act of war;
(c) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance concerned ... in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions ....
Of these defenses, the "third-party" defense has been the most widely
litigated. As its restrictive language suggests, however, the defense does
not hold much promise for PRPs.
One of the most significant limitations of the third-party defense is that
the defendant must have no "contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly," with the party whose conduct allegedly was the "sole cause"
of the release or threat of release. SARA defined the term "contractual
relationship" as including "land contracts, deed or other instruments
transferring title or possession," unless certain narrow showings can be
made.49 Thus, the owner of property may not assert the third-party de-
fense based upon the actions of a prior landowner unless certain limited
conditions are satisfied. These conditions have come to be known as the
"innocent purchaser" or "innocent landowner" defense 0 of CERCLA.
Under the "innocent landowner" provisions, an owner of a site may
avoid liability only if it is able to show that:
46. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057-58 (D.
Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
47. See generally Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12
HARV. ENVTL. L. REP. 385 (1988) (discussion of authority rejecting defenses to
Superfund liability).
48. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
49. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
50. It is anomalous that the "innocent landowner" provisions are referred to as a
"defense," given that they are not a defense at all, but rather an exception to an exception
to the third-party defense.
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(1) the hazardous substance was present when the land was acquired;
and
(2) the owner "did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened re-
lease was disposed of" on the property.51 A purchaser has "no reason to
know" about the disposal of a hazardous substance only if it undertook,
before purchase of the property:
all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the
court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience
on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to
the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or rea-
sonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness
of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property,
and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate
inspection.52
Given the restrictive nature of the innocent landowner "defense,"
those provisions have served to expand liability more than to narrow it.
In general, the requirements of the third-party defense have proven im-
possible to meet.53 Neither Congress nor the courts have defined in any
practical terms the showing that would have to be made by a party to
successfully assert that it had "no reason to know" of the disposal of
hazardous substances.
H. A New Type of PRP?
As discussed above, the four categories of PRPs include current own-
ers or operators and owners or operators at the time of disposal. Notice-
ably absent from this list, however, are "interim landowners." These
would be landowners who first held title after any disposal took place
and who transferred title to another party before any EPA proceeding
was commenced. By the terms of section 107(a), such parties do not
appear to be liable.
As part of SARA's "innocent landowner" provision, however, Con-
gress included a curious provision that raises new questions about the
liability of interim landowners. In section 101(35)(C), Congress pro-
vided as follows:
Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual
knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property and
then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another
51. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U'S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988).
52. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988).
53. See Geiser, Federal and State Environmental Law A Trap for the Unwary Lender,
B.Y.U. L. REV. 643, 684 (1988); Note, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazard-
ous Waste Cleanup Costs under CERCLA, Wis. L. REV. 139, 182 (1988).
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person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be
treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense
under section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to such
defendant. 5
4
Although this provision appears within the "innocent landowner" pro-
vision, and would therefore only apply to parties already liable under
section 107(a), the provision's mandatory language55 arguably modifies
section 107(a) by creating a new, fifth type of PRP: an interim land-
owner who transfers ownership without disclosing any of its knowledge
regarding site releases. Whether Congress actually created such a fifth
category of PRP remains an issue for the courts or Congress to clarify.
I. The Superfund Clean-up Process
Perhaps the worst aspect of CERCLA liability is the costly approach
EPA has taken to Superfund clean-ups. As developed by EPA since
CERCLA's enactment, and as modified by SARA, the Superfund clean-
up process is ponderous, lengthy, and expensive. The process involves
roughly ten steps:
(1) First, EPA or the state environmental agency investigates a site
informally and prepares what is known as a Preliminary Assessment.
The Preliminary Assessment usually involves only a review of existing
records concerning a site and, perhaps, a brief site reconnaissance. The
government agencies do not sample soil, groundwater, surface water, or
air as part of the Preliminary Assessment. Unless access to a site is re-
quired, EPA does not normally inform any PRP that a Preliminary As-
sessment is being prepared.
(2) Based upon the Preliminary Assessment, EPA decides whether it
will perform a further study of the site, known as a Site Investigation.
The Site Investigation consists of a limited analysis of soil, surface water,
groundwater and/or air samples taken from the site. As with the Prelim-
inary Assessment, EPA does not usually inform any PRP other than the
landowner that a Site Investigation is being prepared.
(3) The Site Investigation yields a report that contains data used by
EPA to rank sites on a simplistic mathematical model known as the Haz-
ard Ranking System. The Hazard Ranking System assigns numerical
scores to such factors as the suspected hazardous nature of the disposed
material, containment of the hazardous substances, and distance of the
site to water wells and the surrounding population. This ranking system,
however, is far from perfect. For example, its "affected population" fig-
ure is based upon the population within a three-mile radius in all direc-
tions from the site. By looking at the population within three miles in all
directions, the model considers populations up-gradient, as well as down-
54. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
55. The provision requires that certain defendants "shall be treated as liable."
CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).
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gradient, from the site, and thereby includes non-exposed populations in
assessing exposure potential.56
(4) If the site scores above a threshold number on the Hazard Rank-
ing System, EPA proposes that the site be added to its National Priority
List (NPL). The NPL is the list of sites to receive EPA's most intense
scrutiny. Currently, there are about 1,200 sites either proposed for, or
actually listed on, the NPL.57
Despite the case-by-case determinations that are required in evaluating
each site for inclusion on the NPL, the courts have held that NPL listing
is an administrative process rather than an adjudication.5" According to
administrative rulemaking procedures, EPA must issue a proposed rule
and offer an opportunity for comment. Such comments are in writing
only, and because their review is subject to administrative rulemaking
procedures rather than an administrative hearing, no opportunity is af-
forded for either examination of witnesses or the cross-examination of
EPA's decision makers. Once the final rule is issued, a party may seek
judicial review of the rule in the Federal Circuit Court in the District of
Columbia.
In several instances, PRPs have challenged final NPL listings in the
D.C. Circuit, but in each instance the court has upheld EPA's ruling.59
EPA has succeeded thus far in convincing the D.C. Circuit that listing of
a site on the NPL does not amount to a decision to do a clean-up, but
merely qualifies the site for such work. Courts have generally been will-
ing to overlook the fact that an NPL li sting may force parties to expend
millions of dollars on the subsequent steps of the CERCLA investigative
process even if no remedial work ever is performed.
(5) Either before or shortly after listing a site on the NPL, EPA will
identify PRPs and send them an Information Request which requires
PRPs to furnish EPA with information on the PRPs' relationship to, and
knowledge of, the site. EPA Information Requests are elaborate and re-
sponding to them is increasingly burdensome.
(6) Either before or shortly after listing a site on the NPL, EPA may
send a Notice Letter advising the PRP of the EPA's determination that
the addressee is a PRP. The Notice Letter may offer the PRP the "op-
tion" of undertaking the next step of the Superfund process. That next
step is the performance of an expensive study known as a Remedial In-
vestigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS). The RI/FS is intended to deter-
56. A population is up-gradient if, for example, groundwater flows through the area
of the affected population before it reaches the disposal site. Thus, the up-gradient popu-
lation could not be exposed to any contamination from the site and should not be consid-
ered "affected" by the site.
57. 55 Fed. Reg. 35,512 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 Appendix B).
58. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132, 137 & nn.6-7 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
59. See, e.g., City of Stoughton v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (review of
three separate challenges to the NPL; while agreeing that the petitioners had "colorable"
arguments, the court held for EPA).
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mine the extent of site contamination and to evaluate any necessary
action. An RI/FS typically takes years to complete and may cost mil-
lions of dollars.
The "opportunity" to perform the RI/FS is extended with an under-
standing that declining it will result in one of two responses by EPA:
either EPA will perform the RI/FS and hold the PRP liable for its costs,
or EPA will issue an administrative order requiring a PRP to undertake
the study. As with CERCLA liability, EPA takes the view that PRPs
are jointly and severally obligated to comply with administrative orders.
Therefore, if EPA directs an order to ten parties, and nine are unable to
comply, the tenth is obligated to do the work.
An EPA administrative order may not be ignored. The penalty for
violating such an order, absent proof of sufficient cause, is $25,000 per
day.' Moreover, if EPA performs the study itself and then sues a PRP
to recover its costs, the PRP may be liable for the cost of the work, plus,
absent proof of sufficient cause for noncompliance with the order, puni-
tive damages of three times the cost of the RI/FS.61
(7) If the PRPs opt to perform the RI/FS themselves, an administra-
tive consent order defining the scope of the RI/FS must be negotiated
with EPA. Negotiation of the terms of RI/FS consent orders may take
months, and EPA has shown decreasing flexibility in the terms subject to
negotiation.
(8) After the RI/FS is completed, EPA must decide among the re-
medial alternatives outlined in the RI/FS. This decision is made through
a complicated agency decision-making process that typically takes the
agency months to complete. The result of the decision is reflected in a
detailed Record of Decision (ROD) prepared by EPA.
(9) Once EPA has decided among the remedial alternatives, it may
present the PRPs with the "opportunity" to perform the remedial work.
In an increasing number of cases, EPA orders the PRPs to do the clean-
up work. If there is no order and PRPs volunteer to undertake the reme-
dial action, then they must negotiate the terms of another document, a
judicially-approved consent decree. Like administrative consent orders,
judicial consent decrees may be quite lengthy and complicated.
(10) Finally, either EPA or a PRP (or group of PRPs) proceeds with
the clean-up. Of course, if EPA performs the clean-up, it will attempt to
recover its costs from the PRP through CERCLA's liability provisions.
A simpler process applies when a private party decides to clean up a
site and sue to recover the costs. Increasingly, private parties are using
CERCLA offensively. Having purchased a property containing hazard-
ous waste, a private party may clean up the property and sue the prior
owner to recover its costs for that clean-up.
60. CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
61. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988).
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II. EFFECT OF CERCLA LIARTLITY ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
Even absent a statute like CERCLA, it is intuitive that the discovery
of environmental contamination on a property would diminish the prop-
erty's desirability and, hence, its value. Therefore, whether a public em-
ployee retirement system is purchasing real estate or simply lending
money secured by such property, environmental contamination may lead
to the loss of valuable principal.
CERCLA, however, makes the risks even more significant. Environ-
mental clean-up activities are so expensive that their costs may easily
exceed the value of the property. Therefore, in light of the preceding
discussion regarding the broad scope of parties held liable under
CERCLA, the substances considered hazardous, the costs recoverable,
the standard of liability, and the exceedingly narrow group of defenses
available, it is evident that contaminated property can be worse than
worthless: it may give rise to liabilities disproportionate to the property's
value. For this reason, administrators of employee retirement systems
(or pension plans) must consider the potential for CERCLA liability and
familiarize themselves with the steps necessary to protect against it.
A. Liability of Pension Plans as Property Owners
Like every other owner of property, a pension plan that owns property
faces the risk that such ownership may result in CERCLA liability. Plan
administrators must remember, however, that CERCLA does not hold
liable every entity in a property's chain of title. Such entities are liable
only if they: (1) owned the property at the time of disposal of hazardous
substances; (2) presently own the property; or, depending on the evolving
interpretation of section 101(35)(C) of CERCLA, (3) "obtained actual
knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance"
at a property during their ownership and "then subsequently transferred
ownership ... without disclosing such knowledge."6 2
Thus, a plan that formerly owned property that already was contami-
nated when acquired, but no longer owns that property, should be able to
avoid CERCLA liability as long as it either had no knowledge of any
release or threatened release of hazardous substances during its owner-
ship or, if it did have such knowledge, disclosed it to the purchaser.
6 3
Similarly, if a plan that currently owns property discovers contamination
that pre-dates its ownership, it would appear that the plan could avoid
liability by transferring the property, with appropriate disclosures, before
clean-up activities are initiated. In some cases, purchasers are willing to
62. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).
63. It is unclear, however, whether an entity that acquires an already-contaminated
property that is continuing to leach contaminants into the groundwater would be consid-
ered an owner at the "time of disposal."
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acquire such property, although obviously not for the price that the
property could command if uncontaminated.
If activities during the period of the plan's ownership contributed to
the contamination, or if the plan is holding the property at the time re-
medial action or a cost-recovery suit is initiated, CERCLA liability is a
strong possibility. The third-party defense may be available in such a
situation, but the plan would probably need to establish the elements of
both the third-party defense and the "innocent landowner" provision. In
view of the restrictive wording of these provisions, such a burden would
prove difficult to satisfy.
B. Liability of Pension Plans as Lenders
CERCLA provides that lenders may face liability thereunder as either
owners or operators of contaminated sites." As discussed above,
CERCLA defines the terms "owner or operator" of a facility, rather un-
helpfully, as "any person owning or operating such facility."65 A pen-
sion plan that has extended a loan secured by real property may, of
course, be viewed as holding an ownership interest in the security, partic-
ularly in a state that holds to the "title theory" of mortgages. In title
theory jurisdictions, granting a mortgage actually vests title in the
lender.66
Financial institutions that lend money to companies that own or oper-
ate property contaminated with hazardous substances have long relied
upon the so-called "secured-creditor" or "security-interest" exemption to
shield them from liability under CERCLA. Under CERCLA, the owner
or operator, among others, of contaminated property may be held strictly
liable for the remediation of, and health hazards posed by, that contami-
nation. The secured-creditor exemption excludes from the definition of
"owner or operator" any "person, who, without participating in the
management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the ... facility.",67
Predictably, there is little discussion in the legislative history of
CERCLA regarding the meaning of "participating in the management"
of a facility.68 Some courts and commentators have argued, however,
that CERCLA's legislative history evidences Congress' intent that the
security-interest exemption be construed narrowly to protect lenders
from liability as site owners in states that hold to the "title theory" of
64. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
65. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
66. By contrast, in "lien theory" jurisdictions, a mortgagee holds only a lien on the
property.
67. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
68. The legislative history of the term "operator," however, makes clear that the
term does not include anyone not "totally responsible" for operation. Rather, an "opera-
tor" is one who has assumed "the full range of operational responsibility" for a facility.
H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 36 reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6180.
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mortgages.69
Court decisions establishing lender liability under CERCLA fall into
two main categories: those finding liability based upon lenders that fore-
close on a mortgage and take legal title to a property, and those where
lenders exercise control over the property or the operations of the bor-
rower. In addition, the courts have been debating whether a lender may
hold full legal title to a property "primarily to protect his security inter-
est" without triggering CERCLA liability. Given the importance of
lender liability under CERCLA to pension plans, the leading decisions
will be discussed individually below, including a recent United States
Court of Appeals decision which has caused alarm in the lending com-
munity by greatly increasing the potential exposure of lenders by narrow-
ing the scope of the secured-creditor exemption.7°
1. Case Law
a. United States v. Mirabile
United States v. Mirabile71 was the first case to consider the security-
interest exemption. The court focused upon the degree of participation
in management of the facility, rather than the foreclosure or its timing.
In Mirabile, the owner of a paint manufacturing facility defaulted on a
loan secured by a mortgage. The owner filed for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11, but the petition was dismissed. American Bank and
Trust Company (ABT) then foreclosed on the property and was the
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. Four months later, ABT assigned
the property to Mirable. ABT argued that under Pennsylvania law it
had obtained equitable but never legal title to the property. To recover
the response costs incurred in removing drums of hazardous waste, EPA
brought an action against Mirabile. Mirabile impleaded two banks, ABT
and Mellon Bank (East) National Association (Mellon). The banks im-
pleaded the United States because of activities of the Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) at the site. The lenders argued that they were not an
"owner or operator" and were not participating in management of the
site, but were merely acting to protect their security interest.
ABT had secured the building against vandalism, inquired as to the
costs of disposal of drums located on the property, and had a loan officer
visit the property on several occasions to show it to prospective purchas-
ers. All of these activities took place after operations had ceased. The
court agreed with ABT: "Regardless of the nature of the title received
by ABT, its actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly under-
taken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property."72 The
69. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986).
70. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
71. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
72. Id. at 20,996.
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court stated that ABT had taken "prudent and routine steps to secure the
property against further depreciation."73 The fact that ABT's involve-
ment came after cessation of operations was significant. In a key phrase,
the court found that ABT had not participated "in the day-to-day opera-
tional aspects of the site."' 74 The court granted ABT's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
SBA held a second security interest in the machinery and equipment, a
second lien on inventory and accounts receivable, and a second mortgage
on the real property. SBA never took equitable or legal title to the prop-
erty. Although SBA's loan agreement gave it authority to participate in
day-to-day management, the court found no evidence that SBA had actu-
ally done so. In ruling that the SBA was not liable, the court suggested
that the relevant standard of lender involvement to trigger liability under
CERCLA is actual participation in daily operations, not just the power
to do so. SBA had made repeated visits to the site, but the court deter-
mined that participation in purely financial aspects of the operation was
insufficient to impose liability upon lenders under CERCLA.
The court, however, denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment.
Mellon became involved through its predecessor in interest, Girard Bank
(Girard), which had agreed to advance working capital to the plant in
exchange for a security interest in inventory and assets. After the initial
default on the loan, Girard became increasingly involved in facility oper-
ations. The court held that such activities as monitoring cash collateral,
directing receivables to proper accounts, establishing a reporting system
to the bank, and placing a bank loan officer on the borrower's advisory
board were all activities expected of lenders protecting their security in-
terest. The court held, however, that a question of fact remained as to
whether Mellon's frequent visits to the site, insistence on manufacturing
changes, reassignment of personnel, and day-to-day supervision were suf-
ficient participation in management to render the bank liable under
CERCLA. After ceasing operations, Girard took possession of the in-
ventory and disposed of it through private sales and a public auction.
Ultimately, Mellon settled. 7
The Mirabile court focused more on the question of whether the
banks' activities made them "operators" of the site than on whether the
banks should be considered the "owners" of the facility. The court
stressed the financial institutions' involvement in facility management,
not whether and when a bank held title to real property.76
Moreover, the court noted that CERCLA refers to participation in
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Burcat, Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co.: Pay-
ing the Piper or Learning How to Dance to a New Tune?, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,098, 10,099 n. 14 (citing Andresky, Cover Your Assets, Forbes, Mar. 24, 1986, at
117).
76. Mirabile at 20,996.
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management of "the facility," which it interpreted as "participation in
operational, production, or waste disposal activities," and not in manage-
ment of the business.7 Thus, the court apparently did not view activities
such as overseeing the bookkeeping and records systems as sufficient to
defeat secured-creditor exemption. The court saw a distinction between
a secured lender's involvement in its borrower's financial affairs and in-
volvment in its actual operations.
b. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,78 a bank that fore-
closed on property on which it held a mortgage was held liable under
CERCLA for the costs of removing hazardous substances disposed of on
the property prior to the bank's foreclosure. EPA commenced removal
activities and brought an action against Maryland Bank & Trust Com-
pany (MB&T) to recover the costs of such activities. The timing of the
bank's foreclosure was an important factor.
MB&T argued that it was not liable because of CERCLA's section
101(20)(A) secured-creditor exemption. 79 The court noted that the bank
had held title for four years and thus was the owner. The court held that
the exemption "covers only those persons who, at the time of the clean-
up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in
the land ... The security interest must exist at the time of the clean-
up."8 0 The court stressed that the exemption uses the present tense to
refer to a party who "holds indicia of ownership to protect a then-held
security interest" to explain its ruling. The court also asserted that its
narrow interpretation of the exclusion was in line with Congress' intent
and that a broader interpretation would unfairly benefit the mortgagee
because the property would be enhanced from the clean-up without the
lender being required to contribute to any of the costs.8 1
The Maryland Bank court construed the security-interest exemption
much more narrowly than did the Mirabile decision. The Maryland
Bank court distinguished Mirabile on the basis that the "mortgagee-
77. Id. at 20,997.
78. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
79. MB&T also argued that it was not liable because it was not the "owner and opera-
tor." Id. at 578. The court, in line with other CERCLA decisions, held that it is not
necessary for a party to be both owner and operator of a site for it to be liable under
CERCLA.
80. Id. at 579.
81. See id. at 580. MB&T also raised the third-party defense. The court denied the
government's motion for summary judgment on this question. The government argued
that MB&T had an established contractual relationship with the former owners, and that
MB&T had not exercised reasonable care regarding hazardous substances, or taken rea-
sonable precautions since foreclosure. The court acknowledged that evidence concerning
the contractual relationship between MB&T and the former owners was sparse. The
court could not determine the reasonableness of MB&T's actions because the extent of
MB&T's knowledge about hazardous wastes on the site was in dispute. Id. at 581-82.
Therefore, the issue presented questions of fact which precluded summary judgment.
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turned-owner promptly assigned the property. To the extent that
[Mirabile] suggested a rule of broader application, the Court respectfully
disagreed." 2
c. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
In a case that will frighten lenders who participate in any aspect of
their debtor's operations, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 83 redefined
the degree of lender involvement in a debtor's operation sufficient to in-
cur liability under CERCLA.
The lender, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet), had a factoring agree-
ment with a cloth-printing facility. The agreement continued after the
facility filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter I I of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The debtor-facility then converted the reorganization peti-
tion to one under Chapter 7, for liquidation. The lender foreclosed on
the secured assets, which included machinery, equipment, inventory, raw
materials, work in progress, and packing and shipping materials.
Fleet hired a liquidator to conduct a public auction of the equipment
and inventory, and a contractor, Baldwin, to remove any remaining
equipment. The liquidator allegedly moved drums of dyes and chemi-
cals. The contractor's activity allegedly resulted in a release of asbestos
from the facility.
EPA removed drums of hazardous chemicals and asbestos from the
site. EPA then brought an action against Fleet and against the share-
holders and directors of the debtor to recover the clean-up costs.
The court interpreted section 101(20)(A) to "permit secured creditors
to provide financial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of
specific, management advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA lia-
bility if the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day man-
agement of the business or facility either before or after the business
ceased operation."84
With respect to Fleet's liability, the District Court denied both the
federal government's and Fleet's motions for summary judgment. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that Fleet
was not a present owner or operator so as to establish liability under
CERCLA, because Fleet did not own, operate or otherwise control activ-
ities at the facility immediately before title to the facility was conveyed to
Emanuel County due to foreclosure. 85
The court then turned to the critical issue, i.e., whether Fleet partici-
pated in management sufficiently to incur liability under CERCLA. The
court rejected the distinction delineated by some district courts between
permissible participation in the financial management of the facility and
82. Id. at 580.
83. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 960.
85. Id. at 957.
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impermissible participation in the day-to-day operational management of
the facility. The court held that a secured creditor may incur liability
under CERCLA without being an operator if he participates in the fi-
nancial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to in-
fluence the business' treatment of hazardous wastes. The court held that
it is not necessary for the lender to participate in the day-to-day opera-
tions of the facility in order to be liable. "Rather, a secured creditor will
be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is suffi-
ciently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous
waste disposal decisions if it so chose."86 The court added that "the
lender's capacity to influence a debtor facility's treatment of hazardous
waste will be inferred from the extent of its involvement in the facility's
financial management."87
Applying its new statutory interpretation to the facts, the court held
that from 1976 until the debtor, Swainsboro Paint Works (SPW), ceased
operations in February 1981, Fleet's involvement with the facility was
within the parameters of the secured-creditor exemption to liability.
During that period, Fleet regularly advanced funds to SPW against the
assignment of SPW's accounts receivable, paid and arranged for security
deposits for SPW's utilities, and, when it determined that its advanced
sums exceeded the value of SPW's accounts receivable, informed SPW
that it would not advance any more money.
The federal government alleged, however, that after SPW ceased oper-
ations in 1981, Fleet's involvement with SPW increased substantially.
Fleet purportedly required SPW to seek its approval before shipping
goods to customers, established the price for excess inventory, dictated
when and to whom the finished goods should be shipped, determined
when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office
administrator at the site, received and processed SPW's employment and
tax forms, controlled access to the facility, and contracted with Baldwin
to dispose of the fixtures and equipment at SPW. The court held that
those activities, if proven, are sufficient to remove Fleet from the protec-
tion of the secured-creditor exemption.
Although Fleet contended that its activity was designed merely to pro-
tect its security interest and to foreclose its security interest in the equip-
ment, inventory, and fixtures, the court held that the creditor's motives
were irrelevant. The nature and extent of the creditor's involvement with
the facility determine whether the exemption will apply.8  After noting
that this construction of the secured-creditor exemption is less permissive
than that of previous courts, the court outlined public policy rationales
for the decision, including that the ruling should motivate potential lend-
ers to investigate thoroughly the waste management practices of poten-
tial debtors.
86. 901 F.2d at 1558.
87. Id. at 1559 n.13.
88. Id. at 1560.
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d. United States v. Nicolet
In United States v. Nicolet,89 EPA brought suit against Nicolet for re-
sponse costs at a waste disposal site. Nicolet filed a third-party com-
plaint against T&N plc (T&N), which had a controlling and ownership
interest in the previous owner of the site and held a mortgage on the site.
The United States then amended its complaint to add T&N as a direct
defendant, alleging liability under various theories.
T&N moved to dismiss the United States' first amended complaint. In
addition to responding to this motion, the United States moved for leave
to file a second amended complaint, which sought to hold T&N liable
directly as an owner or operator because it held a mortgage and actively
participated in the management of the facility.
The court granted the United States' motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. In responding to T&N's motion to dismiss, the
court noted that T&N's liability vel non "would depend on [T&N's] level
of participation in the ... facility."90 The court cited and quoted the
district court decisions in Fleet Factors and Mirabile with approval and
stated that existing cases suggest "that a mortgagee can be held liable
under CERCLA only if the mortgagee participated in the managerial
and operational aspects of the facility in question."9 Apparently unable
to resolve this issue on a motion to dismiss, the court denied T&N's
motion.
e. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co.
In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co.,92 the de-
fendant owner of an allegedly contaminated property impleaded the Na-
tional Bank of the Commonwealth (NBC). NBC, a secured lender of the
subject property, attempted to assist the current owner in resolving its
financial difficulties, but ultimately foreclosed on the property. At the
foreclosure sale, NBC purchased the property and took title to it. NBC
held title for eight months.
The Guidice court absolved NBC of liability for its activities before
foreclosure, quoting the Fleet Factors district court's language that the
security-interest exemption has allowed secured creditors "to provide fi-
nancial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of specific,
management advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if
the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day management
of the business or facility either before or after the business ceases opera-
tion."9" The court held that these activities, including participation in
meetings with site officials concerning the status of accounts, personnel
89. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
90. Id. at 1204.
91. Id. at 1205.
92. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
93. Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960
(S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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changes and the presence of raw materials, assistance to the borrower in
obtaining an SBA loan, and even initiation of communication with the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources concerning
waste-water discharges, were all "insufficient to void the security-interest
exemption of CERCLA.... The actions of the Bank prior to its purchase
of the [property] at the foreclosure sale were prudent measures under-
taken to protect its security interest in the property."94
The court justified its ruling regarding NBC's pre-foreclosure activity
on the basis that it would "encourage banks to monitor a debtor's use of
security property."95 The court reasoned that a contrary ruling "would
encourage a lender to terminate its associationwith a financially troubled
debtor."
96
With regard to NBC's actions in purchasing the property post-foreclo-
sure, however, the court adopted the Maryland Bank rather than the
Mirabile approach. The court held that the purchase of the property was
not an action taken merely to protect NBC's security interest in the prop-
erty.97 To hold that purchase of such property at a foreclosure sale does
not give rise to CERCLA liability "would create a special class of other-
wise liable landowners."9" Thus, "[w]hen a lender is the successful pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same extent
as any other bidder at the sale would have been." '9 9
f. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.
The Ninth Circuit decided in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. "o to reject the
restrictive reading of the secured-creditor exemption offered by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Fleet Factors, and to replace the "capacity to influence"
test proposed in Fleet Factors with an "actual participation" test.
Bergsoe Metals (Bergsoe) was formed in 1978 for the purpose of con-
ducting a lead recycling operation. Sometime in 1978, representatives of
Bergsoe contacted the Port of St. Helens (the Port) to discuss the con-
struction of a lead recycling facility in St. Helens. The Port, a municipal
corporation, was empowered to issue bonds to promote industrial devel-
opment in the St. Helens, Oregon area. The Port agreed to issue indus-
trial development revenue bonds and pollution control revenue bonds to
94. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa.
1989).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 563.
98. Id. In arriving at its decision, the court relied on Congress' addition in SARA of
an exemption from liability for state and local governments acquiring "ownership or con-
trol involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment" or similar means.
CERCLA § 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(D). The court, however, explained that
Congress crafted no such exemption for lenders acquiring title through foreclosure.
99. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa.
1989). The court also adopted a very broad interpretation of "disposal" in finding that
the lender was the owner at the time of disposal.
100. 910 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1990).
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provide funds for the acquisition and construction of a secondary lead
recycling plant and related pollution control equipment in St. Helens.
In 1979, the Port sold Bergsoe fifty acres of land on which to construct
the plant. In exchange, Bergsoe gave the Port a promissory note for$400,000 and a mortgage on the property. Once the financing was com-
pleted, Bergsoe entered into a sale-leaseback arrangement with the Port
wherein Bergsoe conveyed to the Port, by warranty deed, the fifty acres
and the future recycling plant in exchange for tenancy under a lease.
The Bergsoe recycling plant began operating in 1982 and soon exper-
ienced financial difficulties. The plant shut down in 1986. On October
21st of that year, the United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank),
which completed the financing for the facility and which held a superior
right over the Port to the Bergsoe lease, put Bergsoe into involuntary
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. By that time, the
State Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) had determined that
various hazardous substances had contaminated the plant site.
In September 1987, the Bank and the trustee in bankruptcy filed suit
against the DEQ and Bergsoe. The defendants counterclaimed against
the Bank and filed a third-party complaint against the Port asserting that
both the Port and the Bank should be liable for the CERCLA clean-up
costs.
While the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bergsoe avoided direct comment
on the decision in Fleet Factors, it did provide that "it is clear from the
statute that, whatever the precise parameters of participation, there must
be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will
fall outside the exemption."'1 ' The court found that the Port held a
mere indicia of ownership solely to facilitate the financings and to secure
performance by the recycler, and thus, because of a lack of actual partici-
pation in the management of that facility, failed to become an "operator"
of that facility. 102
2. Conclusions on Lender Liability Cases
The standards for determining levels of ownership and lender partici-
pation sufficient to incur lender liability under CERCLA are quickly
evolving. With regard to owner liability, the court in Maryland Bank 103
appeared to seek a hard and fast rule that once a bank takes title to a
property as a result of foreclosure, it is the "owner or operator" under
CERCLA. The recent Guidice" case appears to endorse that idea, at
least for properties purchased at foreclosure sales. The other decisions
discussed have not involved or have ignored this question. The remain-
ing decisions discussed above focused on the more difficult question of
101. Id. at 672.
102. Id. at 673.
103. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
104. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
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the requisite degree of a lender's involvement in a facility's management
in order for that lender to incur CERCLA liability. Notwithstanding the
recent decision in Bergsoe, the Fleet Factors0 5 decision poses the greatest
risk for lenders because fine distinctions are beginning to be drawn be-
tween levels of managerial involvement that may or may not trigger
CERCLA liability. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will grant certio-
rari in Fleet Factors and resolve much of the confusion that currently
exists on lender liability under CERCLA.
Lender liability under CERCLA for hazardous substance releases
could alter inexorably the commercial lending industry. It could lead to
an escalation in interest rates, making innovation more difficult. As
noted by the Guidice court, it could increase bankruptcies by making
lenders afraid of trying to work out problems of financially troubled bor-
rowers."°6 Even financially healthy and responsible companies may suf-
fer because of lenders' reluctance to make a loan in the first place. The
general public will ultimately bear the higher costs that a lender incurs
because of the need for such protective measures as environmental au-
dits. Of course, to the extent that pension plans lend funds for properties
that ultimately are discovered to be contaminated, the beneficiaries of
such plans could be the unwilling financiers of hazardous waste clean-
ups.
III. SUGGESTIONS To MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the courts have demonstrated
unusual receptiveness to CERCLA actions and predictable deference to
the positions of EPA and its state counterparts. Nonetheless, as one ap-
pellate court interpreting CERCLA reminded, "statutes have not only
ends but also limits."' 7 With this admonition in mind, the following
steps are reasonable precautions against environmental liabilities that
merit the consideration of public employee retirement systems investing
in or lending funds secured by real property:
(1) Require Disclosure of Knowledge by Seller, Tenant or Borrower:
As part of any land purchase or loan transaction, a plan should require
that the entity (a) selling a property, or (b) seeking to use a property as
security, disclose any knowledge it has concerning existing environmen-
tal conditions and any activities at the property with environmental im-
plications. Such disclosure should be required through representations
made in the transaction documents. With regard to all loan documents,
lenders should be sure to structure the relative rights and responsibilities
of the parties to protect their ability to engage in audits and due diligence
105. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
106. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating, 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
107. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
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activities. Loan commitments should be subject to a satisfactory audit or
inspection result, and termination or acceleration provisions should ap-
ply in the event a lender learns or suspects that a site has become con-
taminated. The documents should also provide that experts be allowed
to inspect the site after the loan date, without notice, so that lenders may
protect their security.
(2) Require Warranties by Land Occupant: With regard to land oc-
cupied by a borrower or tenant, warranties concerning the occupant's
future activities should be considered. An occupant might be required to
warrant, for example, not only that its operations will be in compliance
with the law, but also that its operations will not result in any spills,
leakage, disposal or other releases of any hazardous substances to, on or
from the property. An occupant might also be required to warrant that
its operations will not involve any substances that, if spilled or leaked,
would constitute hazardous waste.
(3) Require Indemnities from Land Sellers, Tenants or Borrowers:
Representations and warranties must, of course, be supported by indem-
nities for their breach. A plan must recognize, however, that such in-
demnities are only as worthwhile as the issuer. In certain circumstances,
indemnities may be sought from the issuer's parent company or affiliate.
If the plan is exposed to direct CERCLA liability, as an owner or opera-
tor, the indemnitor's ability to pay will not shield the plan from that
strict liability.
(4) Performance of an Environmental Review Before Purchase or
Loan: In view of the fact that the preceding steps may not disclose all
knowledge concerning the environmental condition of a property, or that
an indemnity may ultimately prove inadequate, an environmental review
should be undertaken before investing in, or lending funds secured by,
property that may be contaminated. Such a review is especially appro-
priate in light of EPA's Draft Rule."10 Although industrial property is
usually the most suspicious type of property, the potential for contamina-
tion of commercial, farm or residential property should be considered as
well. The review process may be phased where appropriate, with a more
simple review being used as a basis for determining whether more de-
tailed scrutiny is warranted. An initial review should include a review of
EPA's CERCLIS computer database' 09 and any EPA site data, a search
of state and local government pollution complaint files, ascertainment of
present and past land use, and a visual site inspection for indicators of
possible past or present hazardous substance handling. More complex
and costly steps may include the taking of soil and water samples from
the property.
108. See Environmental Protection Agency Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability
Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, (BNA) No. 24, at 1162 (Oct.
10, 1990).
109. CERCLIS is the computer database of sites evaluated for possible Superfund
action.
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Environmental issues raise complex legal and technical questions.
Lenders should consider using outside counsel and environmental spe-
cialists to assist with their environmental evaluations. The law with re-
spect to lender liability under CERCLA is rapidly evolving; legal and
technical experts can reduce a lender's exposure to significant liability by
consulting with lenders as the law and environmental regulations change.
In addition, use of experts by a lender can support a finding by a judi-
cial or administrative body that a lender made reasonable efforts to pro-
tect his security interest from environmental hazards. Perhaps these
efforts would influence a regulatory agency, judge, or fact-finding body to
act favorably toward a lender in such a proceeding.
Although no environmental review, no matter how detailed or costly,
provides a guarantee against purchase of contaminated property, a signif-
icant degree of comfort can be achieved. The performance of a review
can serve both to protect the plan's collateral and to guard against
liability.
(5) Performance of an Environmental Review Before Foreclosure or
Other Participation in Facility Management: For the same reasons that
an environmental review should be performed at the initiation of a loan,
such a review should also be performed before foreclosure or before the
plan intervenes in facility management. Given that either assumption of
title or participation in facility management may destroy the plan's
secured-creditor exemption from liability, the performance of a review
before taking such steps would allow an informed decision regarding the
attendant risks. One conceivable result of such an analysis is a decision
that the risk of liability outweighs any benefits that might be derived
either from foreclosure or participation in the affairs of the borrower.
Another conceivable result would be a decision to proceed with a sher-
iff's foreclosure sale but not to purchase the property.
(6) Control Over the Affairs of Borrower or Tenant: To the extent
that the Mirabile decision may be relied upon, plans may continue to
design loan documents that give plans the power to participate in the day-
to-day affairs of their borrowers without triggering CERCLA liability.
Exercise of such power, however, should be restricted to the most limited
role possible. Whenever plans anticipate specific activities which would
be more involved than general financial oversight, they should exercise
caution and refer to the fifth suggestion above. In light of the Fleet Fac-
tors decision, the actions of a liquidator contracted by the lender may be
attributed to the lender and give rise to CERCLA liability. Lenders
should also keep abreast of the status of EPA's Draft Rule regarding
lender liability, which will more clearly define appropriate lender liability
in such situations.
(7) Limit the Period of Ownership in the Property: The Mirabile deci-
sion and a reading of EPA's Draft Rule regarding lender liability suggest
that if a plan does acquire ownership of a contaminated property through
foreclosure, the property should be disposed of at the earliest opportu-
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nity. If possible, the plan's rights in the property should be transferred
before taking legal title. Of course, the plan must not operate the facility
during the period of its ownership.
(8) Disclose Environmental Conditions When Selling or Leasing Prop-
erty: Plans should adopt policies requiring full disclosure of any of their
knowledge concerning environmental conditions to borrowers or buyers.
Such disclosure not only can avoid assertions of liability under
CERCLA,11 but also can help avoid claims based on fraud or deceptive
practices.
CONCLUSION
While public employee retirement systems are hardly to blame for
most hazardous substance contamination problems, the confluence of
two factors creates a significant risk that they will be pursued as sources
for funding the remediation of such problems. First, the broad language
of CERCLA, as interpreted even more broadly by the courts, enables
anyone who owns or, in some cases, lends money to secure real property
to be the target of a CERCLA action. Second, the enormous costs of
hazardous waste clean-ups create a powerful incentive for EPA, state and
local governments, and private parties to recover such costs from other
parties, wherever they may be found. Entities with substantial assets,
such as pension plans, are the most attractive targets.
Faced with this reality, public pension funds must anticipate the po-
tential risks of environmental liabilities and take steps to avoid or mini-
mize them. Through the exercise of environmental due diligence in
making investments and managing those investments, pension plan ad-
ministrators can satisfy their dual obligations to obtain high-yield invest-
ments, including real estate, and to minimize the environmental liability
risks associated with them.
110. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).

